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Abstract
Even though Niklas Luhmann himself never declared his own approach as a cy-
bernetic one, and even if the relationship between systems theory and cybernetics
is still not clearly defined in every way, it seems to be legitimate to classify Luh-
mann’s Theory of Social Systems into the field of cybernetics approaches, more
precisely as a socio-cybernetic one. Beside the concept of autopoiesis by Maturana
and Varela there are various systems thinkers and cyberneticists like Wiener, Ashby,
Shannon, Bateson, von Foerster who influenced Luhmanns work deeply. Certainly
he fits the cybernetic principles into his theory rather idiosyncratically and partly
after some significant revisions, but one can argue that Luhmann’s Theorie of So-
cial Systems is the conclusion of a confrontation of the mayor issues of cybernetic
discourse with the European philosophical tradition. In the following article it is dis-
cussed the question in what extent we can include Luhmann’s work into the cyber-
netic tradition. Which are the significant connection-points between cybernetics and
Luhmann’s work? What is the relevance of this connection for Luhmanns own theo-
retical development? Which are the congruences and which are the differences? To
what extent is Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems even though his critical distance
- integrable into the spectrum of the approaches of “New Cybernetic” (as Geyer &
van der Zouwen formulated in 1986)? After a short discussion on what is character-
izing a theory as a cybernetic one, the article reconstructs Luhmann’s critical debate
on the most important theoretical problems of cybernetics and finally it will sketch
out Luhmanns answer to this debate, which he gives in his own concepts. For Luh-
mann the fascination of cybernetics consists in explaining the problem of constancy
and invariance of systems in a highly complex and dynamical world by observing
communication processes. This makes cybernetics to a definitive non-ontological
approach and brings it near to the functionalistic sociology.
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1 Introduction
Opting for a cybernetic approach in research means accepting a number of fundamen-
tal principles that are not always unambiguously defined in literature but can be best de-
scribed as a particular mode of thought, as a paradigm, or – as Gordon Pask once put it – as
an art, philosophy or also a way of life1. While mathematician Norbert Wiener stresses the
aspects of control and communication in natural science and humanities contexts, neuro-
philosopher Warren McCulloch defines cybernetics as an epistemology dealing with the
generation of knowledge by communication. Management consultant Stafford Beer re-
gards cybernetics as the science of organisation. To Ludwig von Bertalanffy, cybernetic
systems are a special case of systems differing from other systems by the principle of self-
regulation (Bertalanffy 1968, p. 17). As a scientific discipline, cybernetics distinguishes
itself by concentrating on the research of control mechanisms, basing its activities on in-
formation and feedback as key concepts.2 Walter Buckley formulates the context in a
similar manner by regarding concepts such as information, communication, cybernetics,
self-regulation and self-organisation as well as adaptability as sub-areas of general sys-
tems theory (Buckley 1998, p. 3). Systems theory is understood here not so much as a
uniform theory but more as a theoretical framework and a set of methodological tools that
can be applied in different fields of research.
What is highly significant and is again and again pointed out by all authors is that cy-
bernetics cannot be restricted to a special field of research objects. This meta-disciplinary
view and its interdisciplinary options for application would already suffice to distinguish
cybernetics in an academic world that is still characterised by the theoretical and method-
ical dualism of natural sciences and the humanities. Similar fundamental principles of
organising individual elements as a systemic whole can be found in organisms, in soci-
ety, and in technical artefacts. In the first chapter of “An Introduction to Cybernetics”,
Ashby writes that cybernetics “treats not things but ways of behaving. It does not ask
‘What is a thing?’ but ‘What does it do?’” (Ashby 1957, p. 5). Biologist Humberto Mat-
urana expresses this in a similar way in his answer to the question of life. According to
Maturana, the question of life cannot be answered by seeking the necessary properties of
the elements constituting living organisms, but by tracing the fundamental organisational
1Cf. Heinz von Foerster’s discussion with Bernhard Pörksen for the journal Telepolis
http://www.telepolis.de/deutsch/special/robo/6240/1.html (15.04.1998)
2“The theory of open systems is a generalized kinetics and thermodynamics. Cybernetic theory is based
on feed-back and information.” (Bertalanffy 1968, p. 150). However, this distinction gives rise to a number
of problems, which above all come to the fore with the issue of the closedness or openness of systems. This
will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.
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principles in which “living systems” acquire their identity and through which living sys-
tems differ from non-living systems.3
In his Theory of Social Systems, Niklas Luhmann refers to cybernetic principles
in various contexts without characterising his approach itself as cybernetic or socio-
cybernetic. Nevertheless – and this is my proposition, which I wish to explore in the
following – Luhmann’s theory can indeed be assigned to the field of socio-cybernetic ap-
proaches, albeit with a number of peculiarities. What fascinates Luhmann about cybernet-
ics is that the problem of constancy and invariance of systems is taken up and explained in
a highly complex, changeable world. This “qualifies cybernetics as an uncompromisingly
non-ontological research approach and reveals a surprising proximity to the functionalist
systems theory of sociology” (Luhmann 1968, p. 107).4
It is the orientation of systems theory on regulatory purposes that could be the reason
for the technical application context predominating in the pioneering years and cybernet-
ics earning a reputation of being a technical discipline.5 Because of this, the application of
its principles to social phenomena has often been misunderstood as a transfer of technical
principles to non-technical contexts. However, when Norbert Wiener published his fun-
damental work in 1948, he left no doubt that he wished to see his scientific theory, which
he called “cybernetics”, addressing not only technical systems but also all systems, in-
cluding living and social systems (Wiener 1948) and it was therefore an interdisciplinary
scientific programme that could bear fruit both in the natural sciences and the humanities
and social sciences.6 Gregory Bateson took up this claim in his well-known publication
“Steps to an Ecology of Mind” (1972) and can boast fruitful experience with the cyber-
netic principle in biology, anthropology, psychology and epistemology. Here, the family
therapy approach pursued by the so-called Palo Alto School, centring on Bateson, Jack-
son and Watzlawick, ought to be stressed (Marc and Picard 2000). Today, management
research can also boast a much tried and tested application of systems theory and cyber-
netic principles (Beer 1959; Beer 1981).
The transfer of cybernetic principles to societal processes has been subject to strong
3The approach of defining the identity of living organisms by way of their organisation was already
anticipated by La Mettrie: “But since all the faculties of the soul depend to such a degree on the proper
organisation of the brain and of the whole body, that apparantly they are but this organisation itself, it is
quite obviously a machine” (De La Mettrie 1985, p. 67)
4Translated by the author
5However, there are a number of theory-immanent reasons that will be dealt with below.
6Also cf. Karl Steinbuch, who, in the fourth edition of “Automat und Mensch”, which was very impor-
tant for cybernetics in Germany, added the subtitle “Auf dem Weg zu einer kybernetischen Anthropologie”
(towards a cybernetic anthropology) (Steinbuch 1971)
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criticism right from the start. Suffice it to mention the debate on Georg Klaus’ “Kyber-
netik und Gesellschaft” in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) (Klaus 1965;
Friedrich, Schweizer, and Sens 1975). A scientific breakthrough only seems to have come
in the mid-80ies, when Niklas Luhmann transferred Maturana’s theory of autopoiesis to
social systems7 and adopted the constructivist ideas of “second order cybernetics”. How-
ever, Luhmann applies the cybernetic principles in a very unconventional manner, and
partly only after considerable theoretical revisions. In the following, I would like to ex-
amine the issue of how strongly cybernetics really has influenced Luhmann’s work, and
to what degree it can therefore be referred to as sociocybernetic. First of all, I wish to
develop criteria according to which a theory can be called cybernetic. I will subsequently
reconstruct Luhmann’s handling of the most important theoretical issues of cybernetics.
It can thus be stated that most authors stress the issue of regulation – and in the context
of complex and dynamic systems, this always and above all implies self-regulation – as
the crucial aspect that makes a system a cybernetic system. Here, however, it has to
be stressed that conversely, it is only this question that brings the systemic aspect of the
world into a dominant focus of research. Bearing this in mind, the following aspects can
be emphasised that may be seen as characteristic of cybernetic approaches:
1. System aspect: Research interest focused on handling complexity. A systemic view
is an observation attempting to trace the diversity of interaction in reality instead of
analytically isolating individual causal relations and exploring them in their entire
depth. Systems are defined by a certain form of distinction from their environment.
2. Processuality: Cybernetics “treats not things but ways of behaving. It does not ask
‘What is a thing?’ but ‘What does it do?’” (Ashby 1957). It is not the nature, the
properties, the materiality of objects that forms the centre of its interest but their
forms of operation.
7As readers will know, Maturana himself objected to this transfer. His own concept of society is strongly
characterised by the application of biological principles to social phenomena. The existing biological unity
that human beings have realised via sexual cognition also ought to enable them to create a similarly shaped
union in the cultural sector. This would require the creation of a common area of experience with similar
preferences for all people. This cannot be realised by science but only through “the art of living”. Purely
biologically, the notion of the spontaneous transformation of a society as a biological entity leads to a system
free of oppression which does not negate the individual is an illusion. “Such a system can only be designed
as an artefact of human creativity, namely thereby that all individuals are regarded as important und that the
social system which is building by their interactions becomes a non-hierarchical allopoietic system, which
makes their life worthwhile” (translated by the author) (Maturana 1982, p. 312). Thus Maturana regards
society as a type of organisation in the sense of a means (tool) to satisfy human needs, which tends to be a
disconcerting view for a sociologist.
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3. Receprocity: It is not causality but the mutual influence of dynamic self-regulating
systems that research focuses on. With a cybernetic approach, one has opted for the
examination of the basic forms from which the internal order of a system results
rather than for observing individual properties.
4. Self-referentiality: To Heinz von Foerster, this is the fundamental principle of cyber-
netic thought. He speaks of circularity, referring to all concepts that can be applied
on themselves, processes in which a state ultimately reproduces itself (Foerster
1993a, p. 73). Luhmann adopts this concept under the headword “self-referentiality”.
5. Information aspect: System processes, especially the relation between the system
and the environment, are understood as “informational processes” in which contin-
gencies exist and selection occurs rather than as necessities in the sense of a strict
causality. Information is often referred to as a function of the organisation of sys-
tems. Some natural scientists regard information as a “third factor” next to matter
and consciousness (Weizsäcker 1974) or matter and energy (Stonier 1990).
6. Regulatory aspect: The purposeful influencing of social phenomena always amounts
to an attempt to intervene in highly complex systems with self-organising (dissipa-
tive) structures. These systems respond to attempts to regulate them coming from
their environment only on the basis of their internal structure. Thus regulation has
to handle the phenomenon of the determinedness of systems’ structures.
2 Questions about cybernetics
Luhmann sees the nucleus of cybernetic thought in the notion that a system whose op-
erations are oriented on the fulfilment of certain purposes will orient its behaviour on
a constant feedback from the environment and can therefore cope with a high, unknown
level of complexity. In this manner, the system can maintain a constant level of permanent
impact in spite of different and constantly changing environmental impacts. The means
applied by the system may be dosed differently, and possible changes in the environment
may be compensated for by self-modification. ““It has no need to anticipate these changes
in the environment or integrate them in its planning ex ante. It experiences them ex post
(although if possible immediately) via the feed back of the result of its own effectiveness
and will subsequently accordingly modify its operations.”” (Luhmann 1968, p. 108)8 Re-
8Translated by the author
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garding the environment issue, Luhmann later on refers to this ability to resort to selective
but swift responses as “resonance capacity” (Luhmann 1989, pp. 15).
Luhmann processes cybernetics – more implicitly than explicitly – in the context of
the critical treatment of some basic problems of systems theory. They are first of all the
relation between stability and disturbance and their treatment in the cybernetic model of
equilibrium, secondly the system/environment relation and the relation between entropy
and negentropy in the context of the theory of open systems and thirdly the issue of regu-
lating complex dynamic systems. A fourth aspect of cybernetics that Luhmann is critical
of is how it handles the concept of purpose. However, this controversy will not be dealt
with in further detail here because Luhman later on revised his position in this respect,
following his adopting Maturana’s concept of autopoeisis.9
2.1 Stability and disturbance
Unlike the classic cybernetic descriptions, which identify the stability of systems with
their equilibrium, Luhmann doubts whether maintaining a system in a state of stability (in
the sense of a function of equilibrium) can be a value in its own right. He points to the
debates that already arose longer ago in this respect and questions whether an equilibrium
can be referred to as a stable condition in the first place. This is an issue that suggests itself
particularly from an empirical angle, if the focus is not only on mathematical functions but
on real economic or organisational systems distinguished by a high degree of dynamics.
Taking up the issue of why those institutions that are supposed to guarantee the equilib-
rium of a system ought to endeavour to keep the system in equilibrium, he suggests that
it might make sense to assume precisely the opposite, i.e. to regard nonequilibrium as a
condition of stability (Luhmann 2002, p. 44). This notion already played an important role
in Luhmann’s debate with the structural functionalist system theory presented by Talcott
Parsons and ultimately resulted in a significant correction of Parsons’ theory. Luhmann
no longer determines the character of a social system as a unit with the aid of certain
value and structure patterns, the maintenance of which guarantees the system’s stability,
as formulated by Parsons, but solely with the recursive, mutually referential social actions
(= communication). Whenever there is a succession of communicative actions, a social
system will evolve that delimits itself from an environment. Thus, with Luhmann, dis-
turbance is not an expression of a crisis threatening a system’s stability that could either
9Luhmann accuses cybernetics of radically simplifying the notion of purpose, which results in its not
being suitable for a theory of social systems (Luhmann, 1968, pp. 107-113).
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be overcome by restoring the old state or via the establishment of a new equilibrium.10
Rather, to Luhmann, disturbance represent irritations or stimuli for a system that can trig-
ger resonance in it. What resonance is created, i.e. to what concrete modes of behaviour
the system is necessitated, depends first on the options the system’s existing structure pro-
vides and second on all other factors “irritating” the system. Here, Luhmann’s reference
to Maturana’s concept of “perturbation” can be very clearly recognised.
Luhmann rejects the assumption that social systems necessarily depend on specific
performances that cannot be substituted. Social systems do not cease to exist if certain
system performances fail. In certain conditions, the latter can be replaced with alternative
system performances.
A social system can also enable its further existence by changing its needs or modify-
ing its structures, given changed conditions, without it being possible to clearly determine
from when on such changes constitute a new system that is no longer identical with the
old one (Luhmann 1972, p. 33). While the replacement of an organisation’s leadership
hierarchy with a multitude of small, self-organised units with self-determined external
relations of their own will change mutual expectations, it need not necessarily jeopardise
the organisation’s unity. This is why, in sociological analysis, Luhmann no longer focuses
on the issue of what concrete causal relations ensure a system’s existence but on what sys-
tem performances can be rendered by what functions and what equivalences exist to this
end. It is no longer functional causality that bears relevance but functional equivalence
(Luhmann 1995, p. 52), with the scope of options for equivalent operations being defined
by the system’s structure.
With these theoretical assumptions, the concept of disturbance attains a modified
meaning. It shifts from an event occurring in a system’s environment to a system-internal
event. In this sense, disturbance is nothing else but the initiation of a process that can be
handled operatively in the system (Luhmann, 2002, p. 127) and through which resonance
to events in the environment is generated in the system. And since – as we have seen - the
operative area of options in which the system can act is defined by a system’s structure,
any interference implies the system’s practical reverting to its own internal structure for
the purpose of selecting a suitable action. Luhmann calls such reverting self-referentiality.
Again, Maturana’s influence, already mentioned above, can be clearly recognised.
It can thus be shown that Luhmann seeks to separate the concept of distrubance from
its traditional bondage with the cybernetic model of equilibrium and use it to describe
processes that have traditionally been more associated with the concept of information
10This is why Luhmann replaces Parsons’ term of structural-functional system theory with the term of
functional-structural system theory.
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in cybernetics (Luhmann, 2002, p. 127). However, this in turn also implies – as will be
shown in Section 3 – a semantic shift in the concept of information (Luhmann, 2002, p.
127).
2.2 System/environment relation
Reformulating the cybernetic understanding of stability is associated with a reinterpre-
tation of the basic theoretical understanding of the relationship between the system and
the environment, which had however already been hinted at in the cybernetic and systems
theory discussion prior to Luhmann, especially in Bertalanffy’s work (Bertalanffy, 1968).
Initially based on physical observations, the formulations of systems theory related to
systems in their kinetic and thermodynamic properties. Following the laws of thermody-
namics, these systems tend to assume entropy, i.e. a state in which all distinctions have
been eliminated, an unstructured state in which no distinctions can be made and in which
all possible links are equally probable. This state is also called highly complex or chaotic.
However, thermodynamics sets out from the assumption that the systems dealt with
are closed, that nothing can penetrate them from outside and nothing can escape them.
While such a model can be imagined from the angle of physics for the world as a whole,
it does not fit the conditions within the world. This is why Bertalanffy had already rejected
the notion of closed systems for biological systems and instead advocated a theory of open
systems (Bertalanffy, 1968).
In the context of such a theory, consideration had to be given to the type of exchange
relations between a system and its environment, which, for example, was put into concrete
terms in biology as the issue of energy supply, and for (social or psychological) systems as
the issue of information processing.11 It was asked whether there are specific conditions in
a system’s environment, such as other systems, that are relevant to the system’s existence
and (owing to a certain input) may cause it to display a certain behaviour (i.e. a certain
output).
Luhmann describes two different answers that were initially given to this question by
early systems theory (Luhmann, 2002, pp. 47). One of them supposes a transformation
function via which a structurally determined relation between input and output is realised:
A certain output can clearly be traced back to a certain input. Interest taken in this model
by engineering science can be explained by its supposing technical repetition. The same
input to which the same function is applied will in turn yield the same output. For ex-
11The partly confusing relation between information and entropy will be discussed in more detail in
Section 3.
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ample, this notion has been put into concrete terms in microeconomics by assuming that
certain environmental constellations would allow conclusions to be drawn regarding the
establishment of an adequate organisational structure of businesses, a “one best way”.
Similar assumptions were made in psychology and in political science. But difficulties
occurred precisely in the attempt to apply this ideal mathematical model to reality that
then resulted in the development of a different model of the system-environment relation.
This second model is oriented on the notion of the black box: owing to its complexity,
a system’s interior cannot be recognised. However, from observations of regularities in
the external relations that a system has, one can deduce that there must be some mecha-
nism that can provide an explanation for the reliability of a system, for its rationality, for
predictability of its outputs given certain inputs (Luhmann, 2002, p. 49). Although this
black box model dissolves the notion of a rigid, mechanical or mathematical coupling of
input and output, it is still subject to certain structural basic assumptions with which some
important questions cannot be answered: What arrangements of structure and operation
see to it that certain inputs correlate with certain outputs? What are the acts of selection
relating to this based upon?
Luhmann finds the answers to these questions in the work of the group around Heinz
von Foerster, Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela and others, in which the forms of
exchange between the system and the environment are not – as is the case with the earlier
approaches of systems theory criticised above – determined by the environment but by
the system itself. What is crucial to this theoretical reconstruction is the distinction be-
tween “trivial” and “non-trivial systems” (by Foerster) or “allopoietic” and “autopoietic
systems” (Maturana), which I will deal with in closer detail in Section 3. Autopoietic and
non-trivial systems perform their operations self-referentially by orienting them on their
concrete internal structures and conditions. This is why Maturana characterises these sys-
tems as “structure or condition-determined”, and v. Foerster, following Löfgren, as “au-
tologic”. Thus a renewed reorientation is performed in systems theory, this time towards
“unity”. Here, however, the object is not that of returning to the beginnings of theoretical
development. As will be demonstrated more closely below, this is a theoretical change
that produces a new – one might be tempted to say: dialectic – relation between closed-
ness and openness. Here, the emphasis is not on general energetic closedness as was
assumed in the original physical models but on operative recursivity, self-referentiality
and circularity. It is only this operative closure, Maturana already stresses, that enables
the openness of systems, i.e. their exchange with the environment.
With this reconstruction of systems theory, “a differentiated system is no longer sim-
ply composed of a certain number of parts and the relations among them; rather, it is
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composed of a relatively large number of operationally employable system/environment
differences, which each, along different cutting lines, reconstruct the whole system as the
unity of subsystem and environment.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 7). The difference between
system and environment is the precondition for the identity of systems (243). “Every-
thing that happens belongs to system (or to many systems) and always at the same time
to the environment of other systems (Luhmann, 1995, p. 243). Any change in a system
simultaneously implies changes in the environments of other systems.
One can see that “Systems are oriented by their environment not just occasionally and
adaptively, but structurally, and cannot exist without an environment. (. . . ) difference is
the functional premise of self-referential operations. In this sense, boundary maintenance
is system maintenance.” (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 16). “The environment receives its unity
through the system and only in relation to the system. (...) It is different for every sys-
tem, because every system excludes only itself from its environment” (p. 17). Adapting
systems theory to the system/environment difference as the theoretical guiding principle
torpedoes the old thematic of relations between domination and oppression (p. 17). This
tradition (already started by Aristotle) had set out from a distinction between the whole
and its parts. Autonomy (i.e. activities on the basis of insights into the living together of
people) was only possible by recognising the whole (p. 5).12
2.3 Regulation and feedback
The third thread of theory – characterised by cybernetics – that Luhmann deals with is
the issue of regulation. In a cybernetic context, Luhmann maintains, regulation does not
mean that one can determine the future state of a system. This is neither possible in the
general context, in the essence, if one will say it in “old-european terms” (Luhmann, 2002,
p. 54), nor in all concrete details. All that is possible is not to let specific differences get
too large or to reduce them. Deviations relate, for example, to a certain temperature or a
target. Here too, however, the difference cannot be fully controlled by the system. It can
only experience an alteration via an external impact that can then in turn be corrected by
the system (negative or positive feedback).13
12In contrast, Luhmann defines autonomy – with reference to Varela - as self-referential closure, as a
generation of its unity through the system’s own operations (Luhmann, 1990, p. 289).
13However, Luhmann does ask whether society disposes of something like natural braking mechanisms
or whether the reinforcement of deviation, once performed, can only be stopped by crisis or even disastrous
developments.
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3 Luhmann’s systems theory as socio-cybernetics
Setting out from Luhmanns’ above-mentioned dispute with systems theory and cybernet-
ics, from which he develops his theory, I would now like to again take up some of the
fundamental characteristics of a cybernetic approach already referred to in Section 1 and
examine how Niklas Luhmann applies these basic cybernetic principles in his systems
theory. Here, the central aspect will be to show what Luhmann understands by a cyber-
netic system, and the classic cybernetic question is newly formulated: If system is no
longer regarded as an object but as a difference in which the system is located on one side
and the environment on the other, how is this difference created, maintained, reproduced
and subjected to evolutionary change?
3.1 The concept of system
In philosophical tradition, “system” often refers to what has been composed, as opposed
to the elementary, what has not been composed. In this manner, a certain fundamental dis-
tinction is turned into the starting point of scientific observation: the distinction between
the whole and its parts. For example, Hegel views “das Wahre nur als System wirklich”
(Hegel 1970, p. 28). The individual unit has to remain incomprehensible as long as it is
not observed in its context with other elements. In philosophy, this issue has above led
to heated debates regarding the explanation of life. Since Aristotle, the identity of living
organisms has been defined by their performing certain functions (to fulfil purposes) in
the whole of their interaction. Without considering this wholeness, they would lose their
functions and would be something different from what they are as organs: they would be
reduced to their existence as mere parts. Kant sees the parts and the whole in a mutual
functional relationship that he refers to as the “inner purposiveness of nature”. The parts
are only possible thanks to their relationship with the whole, and they combine to form
the whole in a manner in which the parts and the whole act mutually as the cause and the
effect of one another. “(...) a thing exists as a natural end if it is cause and effect of itself
(although in a twofold sense)” (Kant 2000, § 64, p. 243)
A closer look reveals that the relation between the whole and its parts is also consid-
ered in a double sense in philosophical tradition: This can be shown very well with Kant,
because on the one hand, he stresses the totality of all parts, but on the other the unity of
this totality, which, as the reader will know, is more than, or at least different from, the
sum of the parts. Nowadays, this being different of the whole compared to the sum of the
parts is referred to by the term emergence. Systems cause properties that are no longer
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explainable with the properties of their elements.
In using the system concept, Luhmann takes up this ambiguity but simultaneously
performs a semantic turn of the system by linking it up with state of the art in sociol-
ogy and biology. Having initially been fascinated by Parsons’ notion of describing social
acts as “systems”.14 in theoretically elaborating the concept of the system, he encounters
the research work of cybernetics and general systems theory. The works of Ludwig von
Bertalanffy, Heinz von Foerster, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela have a partic-
ularly strong impact on his further activities and result in a theoretical reconstruction in
which two important modifications are performed in contrast with philosophical tradition:
The first modification is to abandon, to a large degree, the concept of purpose. The second
modification is that the system no longer gains its identity via the relations of the parts to
the whole but via its relation to its environment.
Maturana and Varela maintain the view that “ends” and “functions” no longer bear any
explanatory value (Maturana and Varela 1982, p. 191). Nothing occurs in the evolutionary
history of living systems because it is necessary. Once certain phenomena have occurred,
they are there, and then their existence is unavoidable. “The sole necessary condition in
any given area is those to be a unity, i.e. separable from the environment and therefore
distinguishable from other unities.” (p. 200)15. Maturana and Varela hold that the question
of life cannot be answered by seeking the necessary properties of living organisms but by
identifying their organisational principles.
With the aid of the paradigm of the system/environment difference,16 emergent sys-
tems are described as a constant repetition of this difference at various levels. Complex
systems then no longer simply consist of a certain number of parts and relations between
them but of a more or less large number of system/environment differences that recon-
struct the overall system as a unity of sub-systems and environment at various lines of
intersection (Luhmann, 1995, p. 7). Here, the issue is not that of a network of fixed ele-
ments or substances but of a network of operations belonging to one another that can be
delimited from operations not belonging to them. The equality of the operations consti-
tutes the system’s identity. Thus, in analogy to the definition, it is determined that systems
can only operate within their own system boundaries. They have no opportunity to inter-
vene in other systems, dock onto their environment or modify this coupling (Luhmann
14Parsons no longer regards the unit act as the expression of an acting subject, an actor, but as an emergent
property, reality, and thus as a result of the interaction of various factors of which the actor is only one
alongside the existence of societal structures and the means and purposes at work in them.
15Translated by the author from the German edition
16Luhmann refers to this as the central paradigm of new systems theory (Luhmann, 1995, p. 176)
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1990, pp. 29). Their operations are performed self-referentially, i.e. they are oriented on
the state of their own (and only their own) system, its structural conditions, and criteria
of relevance. System thus becomes a relational term. Maturana calls such systems op-
eratively closed and structurally determined, while v. Foerster speaks of autological and
non-trivial machines (Foerster 1993b).
Operative closure does not mean isolation from the environment. Without doubt, an
energy or materiality continuum must be presupposed for which the system boundaries
do not represent any problems. What counts is the type of process (operations) in which
interaction between different systems or sub-systems occurs. What is meant is the notion
that effect relations can no longer be grasped as “input-output” processes, as was the case
in early cybernetics, but as autonomous, self-regulatory processes. While environmental
influence triggers a system’s responses, it does not determine them! How the system (or
the sub-system) changes primarily depends on the properties, the state of the system, its
respective structure and the system’s internal references.17 The system itself determines
– via the sequence of its own changes in its state – what can, at all, act as an “input”
at a given moment and in a given situation. Thus the system constructs its reactions to
environmental impacts itself.
So the assumption of a centre of gravity that organises the sub-systems for itself (i.e. in
accordance with its objectives) – as Kant maintained – has been abandoned. It has been
replaced with the multitude of system/environment relations leading to a spontaneous
order, to the self-organisation of the system as a whole. Maturana refers to this kind of
organisation in the context of biological research as “autopoietic” because the interaction
of all components of a cell makes it possible to reproduce itself as an autonomous unit
and assures its survival (Maturana and Varela, 1985).
Luhmann separates the “autopoietic principle” from its narrow biological context of
emergence and generalises it. Living systems, conscious systems and social systems are
examples of different systems operating in complete separation. No doubt life is the pre-
condition for consciousness and communication, however not in the sense of a causal
relation but as simultaneity, as a mutual relationship that emerged in a co-evolutionary
process. Maturana calls this structural coupling. Systems are structurally coupled if
they are mutually conditional (e.g. consciousness for communication, communication
for consciousness) but each system operates according to entirely different organisational
principles, for example psychological systems through thinking, social systems through
communication, organic systems through chemical metabolic processes. The elements of
17Maturana speaks of “structural determination”, and Luhmann of “self-referentiality” or “self-
selectivity”.
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the system of consciousness are thoughts. Thoughts can only link up with thoughts. Ac-
cording to Luhmann, the elements of social systems are communication. Communication
can only link up with communication.18 While consciousness is involved in communica-
tion, this is not so in the sense that it communicates itself.
From the angle of this theory, humans cannot be systems because they consist of
several systems operating separately, such as the organic system, the immune system, the
neurophysiological system and the psychological system. All of them operate completely
without overlaps. They relate to one another via structural coupling. Thus, from the angle
of systems theory, society is not a collection of human individuals but communication.
Operative closure also exists between equal systems. For example, there is no direct
link between certain organic systems that are delimited from one another or among sev-
eral psychological systems. Different social systems, e.g. the economic system or the
social system, perform self-referentially closed communication that does not allow them
to operate across systems. Neither is it possible for a certain system of consciousness
to directly refer to another consciousness with the aid of its operations (= thoughts), not
via communication, either. There is no transfer of meaning from one consciousness to
another.19
That it is nevertheless possible to create a relation is due to the structural linkage of
psychological systems with social systems. Via the network of their elements (commu-
nication), social systems provide a basis for the interpenetration of the different systems.
One system of consciousness can influence another via communication, can stimulate it,20
but cannot cause it to display a definite behaviour.
The concept of system described gives rise to two further questions: first, what specific
type of operation performs the reproduction of the system/environment difference in a
given case and, second, how can a system recognise what operations belong to a system
and what operations do not? The first question points to the functional differentiation of
modern society, while the second one points to the problem of observation in the sense of
a simultaneously progressing operation of distinguishing and naming. Both aspects will
be dealt with in further detail below.
18This results from the constitutive rule of sociology that the social can only be explained by the social
(Durkheim 1965), and not by biological, chemical or psychological aspects.
19Thus the self-referential closure of systems is represented in two respects. On the one hand, there are
different types of system that are composed of such different system elements and operations that they rule
out any links and on the other, equal types of system that use equal types of operation but are nevertheless
separated by system boundaries. The issue here is that of the internal system/environment differentiation of
systems.
20Maturana speaks of perturbations, and Luhmann of irritations.
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3.2 Self-referentiality
A system’s self-referentiality results from the fundamental and already described premises
of systems theory, defining the existence of a system purely by the recursive operations
referring to each other and not via an identification and classification, whatever form this
may assume, of a recognising subject. With the term of self-referentiality, Luhmann is fol-
lowing up on one of the most important cybernetic concepts, that of the self-referentiality
of systems. That he does not use the classic term of “feedback” follows from the already
described revision of the system concept and the redefinition of the system/environment
relation. His adopting the autopoiesis concept resulted in one having to recognise that
systems can have no immediate relationship with their external world. Everything that
happens in the world can only be processed by the system by relating to the internal
conditions and to its own range of operations.
Luhmann repeatedly points out that the self-referential closure of systems21 not only
rules out their openness but, on the contrary, is the precise condition for systems being
able to establish contact with a complex and distanced environment. This clarification
bears both a delimitation and, simultaneously, the connectivity of Luhmann’s systems
theory to classic cybernetics.
A delimitation is performed in that the assumption is abandoned that one can always
transform causes into effects (inputs into outputs) in the same manner and hence cause
the system to respond in a predictable manner provided that one knows the transformation
function. Since the question of how a system responds to the inputs in its environment
always depends on the condition into which the system has brought itself (via its own
operations), the relation between the external events in a system’s environment and the
internal structures has to be explored more closely.
The historical situation that a system is in is due not only to the fact that the envi-
ronment has changed but also to its having changed itself (Luhmann, 1990, p. 277). In
this context, Heinz von Foerster speaks of “non-trivial systems”, i.e. systems that are
synthetically deterministic but analytically indeterminable and unpredictable in terms of
their behaviour owing to their dependence on history (von Foerster 1993, p. 252).
Luhmann’s connectivity to cybernetics can be recognised by his regarding the possi-
bilities to relate to the external world in a specific selective performance that he refers to
as information.22 Without this selection, the environment would exist for the system in
21It also bears a system’s autonomy (Luhmann, 1990, p. 289).
22Thus Luhmann also takes Ashby’s claim into account that the self-organisation of a system that does
not relate to the environment is impossible (cf. Luhmann, 1990, p. 276).
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a completely entropic state and without any discontinuities, and no observation and no
relation to the environment could develop (Luhmann, 1990, p. 303).
It can first of all be stated that Luhmann follows the cybernetic insights on self-
referentiality and circularity in the modes of operation of systems.23 However, the systems
have to be in a position to distinguish what belongs to the system from what does not. And
since, as already stressed, systems constitute themselves solely via their operations, this
implies distinguishing their own operations from those in the environment. In answering
the question how systems can be in a position to do this, Luhmann encounters familiar
problems of the philosophical debate on the subject/object relation or the dualism of in-
tellect and body, which, however, cannot be dealt with in detail here. Rather, Luhmann’s
definition will have to suffice in this context: “One can call a system self-referential if
it itself constitutes the elements that compose it as functional unities and runs reference
to this self-constitution through all the relations among these elements (...)” (Luhmann,
1995, p. 33).24
3.3 Information
In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that Luhmann separates the concept of disturbance from
the classic cybernetic model of equilibrium and uses it to describe processes that are usu-
ally seen in the context of information in cybernetics. To this end, he has to perform
a semantic shift of the information concept (Luhmann, 2002, p. 127) that will now be
looked at more closely. Clarifying this modification is of considerable importance in as-
sessing the significance of Luhmann’s work for cybernetics because, as the reader will
know, in Luhmann’s theory of social systems, it is communication, and not information,
that is presented as the basal category. This gives rise to the question to what degree
Luhmann’s theory of social systems really can be seen as part of a continuous line, to-
gether with cybernetics, in spite of its several theoretical references, or whether it does
not instead represent a break of this tradition.25
23In this respect, he assumes a critical distance from “so-called radical constructivism”, which he accuses
of “not yet having done its homework properly” since it still sticks to the traditional European guiding
distinction between the subject and the object (Luhmann, 1990, p. 521).
24Here, it can only be pointed out that regarding the self-description of a system, Luhmann distinguishes
between different levels of reflection each of which is characterised by a special form of self-observation.
However, Luhmann is sceptical about a possible rationality with respect to society as a whole resulting
from this. He regards it as highly improbable, since to him no representation of society that would be free
of competition is conceivable that could represent the whole (Luhmann, 1995, pp. 443 and 1997, pp. 866)
25Despite the clear dominance of the communication concept, there are scattered indications of continu-
ity in Luhmann’s work: “The method of functional analysis that we will assume throughout is based on the
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No doubt information is one of the key terms of cybernetics, even though, just like
other concepts, it has never been given a standard definition. And it is certainly no exag-
geration to claim that the inconsistent use of this key term may have contributed to the
hopes originally associated with cybernetics of overcoming the division between the nat-
ural sciences and the humanities have not been fulfilled so far. Whereas on the one hand,
information has been referred to as a phenomenon of being (for example in the context of
genetic information)26, on the other, information has been regarded as an event generating
meaning in communicative or action contexts.27
At no point in his work does Luhmann treat the various concepts of information pre-
sented by cybernetics in detail. Information is usually only dealt with in connection with
the discussion of his communication concept. However, it does become clear that Luh-
mann refers to various cybernetic authors and addresses various issues there. For example,
regarding Norbert Wiener and Heinz von Foerster, he adopts the aspect of structure and
order formation by information28, thus counter-positioning himself to Shannon, who, as
the reader will know, has conversely referred to information as an expression of entropy
and hence as a measure of disorder. However, at the same time, he relates positively
to Shannon by sharing his view of information as selection and not as a substance of
whatever nature. What can clearly be recognised is Ashby’s influence on formulating the
distinction between utterance and information, which plays a central role in Luhmann’s
concept of communication. This distinction and the event character of information that
was formulated by Bateson (and again contradicted Shannon) are the theoretical build-
ing blocks with which Luhmann opposes the transmission metaphor in communications
science literature.
“The metaphor of transmission is unusable because it implies too much on-
tology. It suggests that the sender gives up something that the receiver then
concept of information. This method serves to obtain information. (Whether this also pertains to ‘explana-
tion’ depends on the account of the concept that one gives). It regulates and specifies the conditions under
which differences make a difference.” (Luhmann 1995, p. 52). Also cf. Luhmann, 2002, pp. 127.
26Cf. here (Ebeling, Freund, and Schweitzer 1998; Stonier 1990)
27Cf. here Bateson: “The technical term ’information’ may be succinctly defined as any difference which
makes a difference in some later event. This definition is fundamental for all analysis of cybernetic systems
and organization” (1972, p. 381). Also cf. Weizsäcker, who puts more emphasis on the issue of semantics:
“Information is only what can be understood” (Weizsäcker, 1974, p. 351).
28“Therefore information is an event that constrains entropy, without thereby pinning down the system”
(Luhmann, 1995, p. 68). Also (cf. Wiener 1951, pp. 82). Also cf. H. von Foerster, who has formulated the
principle of “Order from Noise” (von Foerster, 1993).
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acquires. This is already incorrect because the sender does not give up any-
thing in the sense of losing it. The entire metaphor of possessing, having,
giving, and receiving, the entire ‘thing metaphoric’ is unsuitable for under-
standing communication.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 139)
Systems – and in particular systems processing meaning – have no other option but to
reduce the descent in complexity between the diversity of events in the environment and
their own processing capacity, which is connected to their operative closure and cannot
be avoided, via specific selective performance. They have to minimise the multitude of
options to respond to random environmental stimuli in order to remain able to act.
The problem that both Luhmann and Shannon are confronted with is that of filtering
the relevant signals out of a multitude of options (signals on hand).29 Shannon concen-
trated on the issue of how signals could be transmitted in spite of inevitable interference
in the course of the message transmission process out of which information emerges.
Any interference can be treated as a message or a signal in its own right. And initially,
no distinction can be made between information and disturbance because one cannot yet
determine which of the signals are unexpected or undesirable (i.e. which ones interfere)
and which ones are desired. In the case of Shannon, related to the technical problem of
communication, this is the task of communications technology. But it can no doubt be
generalised and referred to as the task of any information-processing system.
To Shannon, signals generally emerge from noise. There is no transmission of “fault-
free”, signals that emerge clearly comprehensible. Noise is the precondition for informa-
tion.30 Messages will only acquire their information content against the background of
the other alternatives that may be conceivable but are not selected in the specific situation.
The more extensive the latter are, and the more often a selection has to be performed, the
higher a message’s content, according to Shannon.
Thus information relates “not so much to what you do say, as to what you could
say. That is, information is a measure of one’s freedom of choice when one selects a
message” (Weaver 1963, p. 100). In other words, the more alternatives it rules out, the
higher information will be. Shannon ascribes the highest value of information content
29With the issue of what criteria are used, what a system deems relevant and what it does not, remaining
unsettled.
30Systems have no other option but to make use of noise to acquire or construct information. Information
will not be sought without the uncertainty caused by the noise. This also applies in the case of Bateson:
“All that is not information, not redundancy, not form and not restraints – is noise, the only possible source
of new patterns” (Bateson 1972, p. 410).
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to the message with the lowest probability.31 Conversely, if a message is expected with
certainty, or if its arrival follows a necessity, then its informational value will be nil.32
Thus to Shannon, information is the expression of the probability or improbability of
the occurrence of events if a limitless and dynamic supply of signs are used, measured
in “binary digits” (bits). This can also be regarded as a system’s measure of entropy
(Shannon 1963, pp. 18; Weaver, 1963, pp. 103)
Luhmann no longer follows Shannon at this point. What he accepts is the aspect that
brings the novel character of information to the fore (Luhmann, 1995, p. 67), and that
noise raises information, without, however, laying claim to wishing to measure the de-
gree of information. In particular, he does not follow Shannon’s proposition on entropy.
No doubt it is particularly the unexpected, the surprising (and also the undesirable) that
rouses our attention, which is also what makes it informative. And in this sense, any
disturbance enriches communication (in the sense of generating information). But while
Shannon refers to signal processing that is performed in the external world of an observer
and information-generating selection therefore increases entropy in the external world,
Luhmann shifts this to the internal world of a system observing the environment. And
it is at this point that his reformulation of the concept of information sets in: Informa-
tion occurs whenever a selective event (of an external or internal kind) works selectively
within the system, namely, can select the system’s states ” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 40). Here,
Luhmann directly follows Bateson: “A ’bit’ of information is definable as a difference
which makes a difference. Such a difference, as it travels and undergoes successive trans-
formation in a circuit, is an elementary idea.” (Bateson 1972, p. 315)33. This means
that information only acquires its character as information when it triggers an internal
modification of conditions in a system.
Such an internal modification of conditions presupposes existing structures that some-
how pre-arrange the options for action. What counts in a given situation is how a sys-
tem makes use of its internal structures, what options for action it updates and mobilises
and which ones it does not resort to. Information only occurs temporarily as an event.
However, it is not lost, for it leaves behind a structural effect via the modification of the
31“It is generally true that when there is noise, the received signal exhibits greater information – or better,
the received signal is selected out of a more varied set than is the transmitted signal.” (Weaver, 1963, p.
109)
32Similarly, Luhmann writes: “(. . . ) information that is repeated is no longer information ” (Luhmann,
1995, p. 67).
33“In fact, what we mean by information – is a difference which makes a difference, and it is able to
make a difference because the neural pathways along which it travels and is continually transformed are
themselves provided with energy.” (Bateson, 1972, p. 453)
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system’s condition. Against this background, Luhmann can now state: “Information pre-
supposes structure, yet is not itself a structure, but rather an event that actualizes the use
of structures” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 67).
So we can formulate the chief differences between the theories of Shannon and Luh-
mann as follows: Shannon defines information as a selection from signals that exist in
the external world. This means that information acts as an input into the system selecting
it. Since Shannon only relates to the technical problem of how signs can be transmitted
as accurately as possible, he does not make any statements on the semantic or pragmatic
aspects. However, one can assume that he sets out from messages which, once they have
been selected by the recipient, are the same both to the transmitter and the recipient, and
that they mean the same to both. This assumption of a transmission of information has
persistently been criticised from a humanities and social science angle, and today, espe-
cially against the background of a second-order cybernetics, it is no longer tenable in the
natural sciences either. Even if, seen empirically, an item of information does have the
same meaning for the transmitter and the recipient, this is not guaranteed by the content
quality of the information but is only constructed in the course of a process of communi-
cation (cf. Luhmann, 1995, pp. 139).
To Luhmann, the environment does not contain any information at all. There are no
circumstances that can simply be registered or ignored. There are no objects that could
be viewed from various angles and the quantities and properties of which one could de-
termine. Information is permanently produced within the system itself, in the course of
communication. As opposed to Shannon, Luhmann focuses more strongly on the inter-
nal conditions of a system. He is above all concerned with the issue of how the self-
referentially operating system relates to its environment via information. This is where
the different application contexts of the two theories also become apparent.34 Having ini-
tially generalised a purely technical understanding of Shannon’s concept of information
with regard to the aspect of selection, Luhmann now limits it to systems that are capa-
ble of orienting themselves on differences (e.g. on the difference between external and
internal conditions), in other words on systems that are tied to a self-referential mode of
operating (Luhmann, 1995, p.40) or, as H.v. Foerster puts it, to “non-trivial systems”.
34Regarding Shannon’s concept of mathematical information theory, Luhmann leaves no doubt about
its limited range of application in social sciences, which above all results from technical systems and sys-
tems processing meanings operating according to entirely different patterns. “The concept of information
presented here serves only for technical calculations and leaves meaning references completely out of con-
sideration, but this does not imply that selectivity is not important in meaning contextes” (Luhmann, 1995,
p. 529, note 4).
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But how does this communicative constitution of information happen in social sys-
tems? Luhmann persistently clarifies that he is interested first in a non-intentional and,
second, in a sociological concept of communication that differs significantly from a psy-
chological view (also cf. Fuchs 1993, pp. 25). This means that his understanding of com-
munication is not oriented on a speaker’s or transmitter’s intentions or on whether such
intentions (which no doubt exist in communication) are “correctly” understood by the lis-
tener or the recipient in the sense of the speaker’s original intention. In his event-oriented
concept of communication, there can be no “misunderstandings”, no faults and no mis-
takes. He wants to see how communication takes place, and how information emerges
in this context. To Luhmann, understanding is an empirical event that does not yield in-
formation on what is right or wrong but solely about the communicative links. In what
direction is communication moving? What answer is given to what question? Under-
standing merely informs about how information and utterance are distinguished from one
another in a given situation. This distinction is fundamental to Luhmann’s concept of
communication.35
3.4 Regulation and Control
It has already been pointed out in Chapter 2.3. that to Luhmann, any regulation first of
all can be nothing but a self-regulation of the system, and that neither the environment (or
a system located in it) nor the system itself can assume complete control. It is probably
in the issue of control that Luhmann and classic cybernetics are furthest apart. Regarding
this question, however, Luhmann largely subscribes to the autological concept of Löfgren
and H.v. Foerster, so that it is safe to refer to his concept as cybernetic, even if the
specialities of second-order cybernetics have to be stressed in this context.
Heinz von Foerster distinguishes between the control behaviour of trivial and non-
trivial machines. Trivial machines have evolved from a specification of the individual
system elements and their mutual interaction and correspondingly respond to attempts to
control them. Given a clear input, they will produce a predictable output (e.g. steering a
car). In contrast, non-trivial machines have evolved through spontaneous emergent struc-
tural developments and do not respond in the sense of a clear input/output relation. They
modify their behaviour solely through internal modifications of their condition. Thus in
35Luhmann defines communication as the unity of a three-level selection of information, notifying and
understanding. Here, understanding assumes a special role in that it distinguishes information from noti-
fying. The details of this construction cannot be explained more closely in the context of this essay. An
elaborate account of them is given in Luhmann 1995, pp. 140.
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attempting to control them, one has to rely on creating such internal modifications of
conditions and thus cause the system to behave in the desired direction. 36
The paradigm shift caused by second-order cybernetics results in the question of pos-
sibilities to steer social systems assuming more urgency. What is of key significance here
is the approach to no longer view complex and differentiated systems as a relation of the
whole to its parts or of the superordinated to the subordinated, but as a relation between
the system and the environment. Thus controlling a system can no longer primarily ad-
dress hierarchical relations but has to take heterarchy and the diversity of operatively used
system/environment differences into account.
Just how radical the control theory change introduced by second-order cybernetics
really is can be demonstrated by a brief comparison with traditional approaches that also
stress the principle of self-organisation. As the most prominent example, I would like
to refer here to Kant’s theory of the self-organisation of life. Kant’s concept of self-
organisation37 can be summed up as follows: The parts are only possible thanks to their
relation to the whole, and they link up as a whole in a manner that parts and whole are
mutually the cause and effect, purpose and means, of one another. Using a clockwork as
an example, Kant describes just how much this view differs from a mechanical concept.
“In a watch one part is the instrument for the motion of another, but one wheel
is not the efficient cause for the production of the other: one part is certainly
present for the sake of the other but not because of it. Hence the producing
cause of the watch and its form is not contained in the nature (of this matter),
but outside of it, in a being that can act in accordance with an idea of a whole
that is possible through its causality.” (Kant 2000, §65, p. 246)
Whereas a machine merely has a force that can set things in motion, organised organ-
isms possess a formative force, “and indeed one that it communicates to the matter, which
36With these modifications, of course, not being predictable in principle either. Unlike trivial machines,
which v. Foerster characterises as 1. synthetically determined, 2. analytically determinable, 3. independent
of the past and 4. predictable in their behaviour, non-trivial machines are 1. synthetically determined, 2.
analytically determinable, 3. dependent on the past and 4. unpredictable in their behaviour (Foerster 1993b,
pp. 244).
37As far as I know, Kant was the first to use the term “self-organisation”: “One says far too little about
nature and its capacity in organized products if one calls this an analogue of art: for in that case one
conceives of the artist (a rational being) outside of it. Rather, it organizes itself, and in every species of
its organized products, of course in accordance with some example in the whole, but also with appropriate
deviations, which are required in the circumstances for self-preservation. Perhaps one comes closer to this
inscrutable property if one calls it an analogue of life.” (Kant 2000, § 65, pp. 246)
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does not have it (it organizes the latter): thus it has a self-propagating formative power,
which cannot be explained through the capacity for movement alone (that is, mechanism)”
(Kant 2000, § 65, p. 246).38 Thus to Kant, life, unlike lifeless nature, means the ability of
a substance to organise and reproduce itself only through intrinsic principles and “that in
which everything is an end and reciprocally a means as well. Nothing in it is in vain, pur-
poseless, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature.” (Kant, 2000, § 66, pp. 247).
So although he stresses the principle of self-organisation, Kant sees a sort of dominating
relation39 between the whole and its parts (the whole organises its parts for itself).
Such assumptions have become untenable according to the principles of second-order
cybernetics.40 Neither in biological nor in social systems can an instance claim to have
a better, more truthful, more detailed or more exact description of the whole, individual
parts or the relation between them. In modern sociology, especially in Luhmann’s theory
of social systems, this insight is expressed in the notion of a functional differentiation of
society. The social sub-systems in modern society are distinguished from one another (and
thus respectively for social systems of their own) by performing certain special functions
for society as a whole. Their communicative operations are entirely focused on fulfilling
such a special function. The economic system observes everything happening in the world
from the angle of economic relevance, the legal system from whether laws are breached
and the political system from whether issues of power are affected.
Luhmann describes modern society as the result of historical change, as a transfor-
mation from a stratificatory to a functional differentiation of society. While enormous
hierarchical inequalities exist in the stratificatory society, it could still rely on a uniform
semantics. Of course the world appeared to the aristocrat in a different way from how
it did to the peasant, but it was nevertheless the same world. This is the only possible
explanation for the differences not even being perceived as inequalities – for example in
38Unlike H.v. Foerster or H. Maturana, Kant did not believe that it is possible to determine life on
the basis of the laws of mechanics. Attempts to give an explanation in this manner would tend to overlook
precisely the special quality of life, i.e. what distinguishes an organism from a mechanism. Kant maintained
that there would never be a “Newton of grass blades ” (2000, § 75, p. 271). But it is exactly what Kant
doubted that is elevated to the status of a programme by Maturana and others and artificial life research,
which is based largely on this proposition.
39Aristotle already regards dominance as the medium securing the unity of the whole: “(...) in every
composite thing, where a plurality of parts, whether continuous or discrete, in combined to make a single
common whole, there is always found a ruling and a subject factor, and this characteristic of living things is
present in them as an outcome of the whole of nature, since even in things that do not partake of life, there
is a ruling principle, as in the case of a musical scale” (Aristotle 1950, p. 19)
40Although Maturana does see the possibility of such subordination, too. However, these are then special
cases in which autopoietic systems are treated allopoietically (Maturana and Varela 1985, p. 188).
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the sense of injustice. However, this changed radically with the transition to a functional
society. The uniform character of hierarchical order explodes into the plurality of a heter-
archical order.41 Every functional system has its own view of the world that differs from
that of other functional systems and cannot be traced back to a common pattern. Now,
however, to take up the issue of the relation between stability and instability, this heter-
archy by no means indicates a state of disorder. On the contrary, from the angle of each
individual system, the relations to the other systems are subject to an order of their own
that in turn is subject to the primacy of its own function (Esposito 2002, p. 201).
This results in an enormous increase in contingency (Esposito, 2002, p. 203). A
change in the form of observation – that of observing observation – ensures that this does
not lead to a collapse of orientation and order (cf. Esposito,222 2002, p. 204).
Whereas some systems theoreticians42 continue to regard control as indispensible and
here stress the importance of the political system as an institution, Luhmann points to the
internal motives of the respective social systems and consistently takes up the previously
elaborated cybernetic pattern of argumentation:
“Although there is no possibility to intervene in structural developments from
outside, the irritations that a system has to deal with again and again – and
also the indifference that it can afford – play an important role” (Luhmann
1997, p. 780) 43
However, Luhmann sees no convincing indication of the danger of a ruthless juxtapo-
sition or opposition of the functional systems:
“If modern society were merely described as a set of autonomous functional
systems that owe each other no consideration but merely follow the repro-
duction needs of their own autopoeisis, this would yield a highly one-sided
picture. It would then be difficult to understand why this society would not
explode or disintegrate within a short time” (Luhmann, 1997, p. 776)44
Here too, he takes up Maturana’s concept of structural coupling but gives it a socio-
logical turn by relating the necessary self-regulatory processes to the impact of regulatory
41With this order including, however, a multitude of simultaneously existing, equal hierarchies (Esposito,
2002, p. 201)
42cf. Helmut Willke, who, however, prefers the term “intervention” regarding the relation between state
and society (Willke 1992).
43Translated by the author
44Translated by the author
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media or, in Talcott Parsons’ language, to symbolically generalised communication me-
dia. Here, highly-condensed information is involved that enables action and communica-
tion links in symbolic form without the pre-understanding and motives they are connected
with having to be negotiated and co-ordinated anew again and again. Such media serve
the purpose of communicating what a system expects of its environment or, in concrete
terms, from another system, and they simultaneously provide the motivation for the other
system’s really fulfilling this expectation of behaviour. In other words, they raise the
probability of communication’s capability of linking up (connectivity), thus contributing
to the success of communication.
In this respect, success media first of all have a symbolic character, i.e. they stand for
something (one is prepared to exchange goods or render services provided that they are
paid for), and secondly are generalised, i.e. they apply independently of concrete situa-
tions. Thanks to these two features, symbolically generalised communication media are
capable of performing two things: First of all, they stabilise communicative relations on a
lasting basis, thus contributing to the formation of systems. Second, they represent a sort
of catalyst for the differentiation of systems. This reduces complexity. Simpler types of
system evolve that can concentrate on certain aspects of events in the world. But on the
other hand, for the system affected, this leads to a new type of complexity that Luhmann
refers to as hypercomplexity. The creation of autonomous sub-systems inevitably results
in a multitude of new interfaces between the differentiated autonomous sub-systems (in-
terface complexity), so that new, previously unexpected modes of response now have to
be reckoned with.
Social systems are based on communicative operations and therefore primarily on the
use of language. In spite of this, the formation and maintenance of systems cannot be
attributed solely to the effect of the language medium. For its use simultaneously and
generally always entails a threat to the autopoiesis of communication. On the one hand,
it is language that enables social understanding in the first place, but on the other, the
more precise the use of language becomes, the greater the possibility of divergence and
rejection of communicative offers will be (Luhmann, 1989, p. 235). According to Luh-
mann, that communication can develop at all has to be regarded as something principally
improbable. That social systems evolve and stabilise in spite of this improbability can be
explained with the effectiveness of symbolically generalised communication media.
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4 Final note
The above has shown that the relation to cybernetics not only assumes a very important
status for the development of Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems, but that, con-
versely, Luhmann’s systems theory can be integrated in the range of “new cybernetics”
(Geyer and Zouwen 1986) approaches as a type of socio-cybernetic thinking. The list of
criteria drawn up at the beginning of this paper that qualify an approach as cybernetic
was to serve as a guideline to evaluate the cybernetic content of Luhmann’s theory. Luh-
mann does not eliminate the uncertainty referred to above regarding how systems theory
and cybernetics relate to one another either. While preferring to use the term system for
his approach, in his definition of concepts, he refers to central controversial aspects of
the debate on the relation between the two disciplines at the time. With the adoption of
Maturana’s concept of autopoiesis, the circularity principle (cf. von Foerster, 1993) as-
sumes a central role in his theory, which can therefore, without any doubt, be qualified
as cybernetic. In his systems concept, his notion of the relation between the system and
the environment, he follows up largely on modern systems theory literature (Bertalanffy,
1968). What sociology gains through the application of cybernetic principles is a convinc-
ing theoretical explanation of the phenomenon of how communication becomes possible
in spite of double contingency. This is no more and no less than a satisfactory answer
to sociology’s fundamental question about social order. Luhmann argues with circular
causal feedback principles as a response to communications problems in social systems.
And he takes the problem more serious than hardly any other sociologist that heterarchy
within regulatory systems, which is stressed by cybernetics (in particular second-order
cybernetics) can no longer be described with causal or technical models. While this does
not yet represent a socio-cybernetic regulatory theory, it could mark the approach to the
direction such a theory would have to be developed in.
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